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Combing and Curling: Orator Summus Plato^
HELEN F. NORTH
The title of this talk may recall the subjects taught in the school attended by
the Mock Turtle in Alice in Wonderland: reeling and writhing and fainting
in coils, but actually the first part (combing and curUng) comes from quite a
well-known passage in the treatise by the Greek critic, Dionysius of
Halicamassus, On Composition, and the second from Cicero, in De Oratore.
Dionysius was one of that influential group of Greek men of letters
—
teachers of rhetoric, literary critics—who settled in Rome in the age of
Augustus and provided guidance in the advanced study of Greek literature for
rich and cultivated Romans, often men with political ambitions. Most of
them regarded Demosthenes as the supreme master of oratorical style: They
found in him the ultimate exemplar of what they called deinotes (awe-
inspiring intensity)—ever the most admired trait in oratory of the grand
style. But they discussed and analyzed in minute detail passages from many
o^er authors as well, and one of them was Plato. In Chapter 25 of the
treatise On Composition Dionysius comments on the tremendous care that
Plato devoted to securing the most effective arrangement of words. Even at
the age of 80 he was still "combing and curling his dialogues and braiding
them in every way" (xotx; ea-uxoO 6iaX6YOD(; Ktevi^cov Kal PooTp-oxiC*^^
Kal ndvxa xpoTtov dvanXeKcov).
There follows the famous story about the notebook found among
Plato's effects when he died: It contained many different arrangements of the
first sentence of the Republic. It is not certain whether it was only the first
eight words (KaxePriv x^zc, ei<; OEipaia \izxcl rX,at>iccovo(; xou
'Apiaxcovoq) that Plato kept combing and curUng, or the whole sentence (up
to vvv np©xov dYOvxe<;). Quintilian, who also knows the story, seems to
imply that it was only Uie first four words (KaxePriv x^zc, zic, Heipaia, 8.
6. 64), which would be even more remarkable. Both ancient and modem
critics have been fascinated by what Dionysius rightly calls Plato's
philoponia (love of labor) in reworking this passage. Demetrius, perhaps a
^ Apart from supplying references, 1 have made only minimal changes in this lecture,
which I had the honor of delivering on March 22, 1989 at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, as part of a memorial to Friedrich Solmsen, revered teacher and friend for
more than forty years.
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contemporary of Dionysius, in his treatise On Style (c. 21) analyzes the
entire sentence (as far as ayovteq) and comments on the studied ease and
relaxation of the period that he finds there, while J. D. Denniston, in Greek
Prose Style, provides an enlightening discussion of the first eight words,
suggesting some of the reasons for their exU^aordinary felicity. ("The effect
may seem due to accident"—he says—"but such accidents do not befall
inferior writers.")^
I chose the quotation from Dionysius to emphasize an aspect of Plato's
achievement that exerted tremendous influence in antiquity, yet has received
comparatively little notice in our own time, compared, that is, with the
amount of attention devoted by modem scholarship to his dialectic, his
theory of Forms, his concept of love, of the ideal state, of education, and so
on. I mean his rhetoric. The scrupulous, unremitting attention to word-
placement, which caught the attention of Dionysius, is but one result of
Plato's upbringing in the Athenian world of the last quarter of the fifth
century, dominated intellectually by the Sophists and incurably infected by
sophistic rhetoric. The ancient critics recognized Plato as a product of this
revolutionary movement, and this is why Cicero says in De Oratore that, in
spite of making fun of the orators, Plato seemed himself to be the orator
summus, the consummate orator (1, 47): in oratoribus irridendis ipse esse
orator summus videbatur.
To be sure, one phase of Plato's relation to rhetoric has always received
more than adequate attention (as it does in the passage from Cicero just
quoted): his hostility, most systematically and fully expressed in the
Gorgias and the Phaedrus, but prominent in many other dialogues as well,
from the Apology with its ostentatious rejection of the sophistic kind of
deinotes, through the Menexenus, that devastating parody of the standard
funeral oration, and the Symposium, with its merciless imitation of
Agathon's Gorgianic style, to the Theaetetus, which contains a vivid
contrast between the forensic advocate and the philosopher, highly
derogatory, of course, to the advocate.
The reasons for Plato's opposition to sophistic rhetoric are too well
known and often rehearsed to warrant extensive analysis here.^ Let me just
recall that it was not only the perverse influence wielded by rhetoric on both
politics and the ethics of the individual that aroused Plato's hostility. Even
more basic was the fact that sophistic rhetoric took the side of appearance in
the conflict between appearance and reality that lay behind much of the
Socratic-Platonic philosophy. Rhetoric, as it was developed in the late fifth
century and practiced in the early fourth, was concerned, not with
knowledge, but with the appearance of knowledge. It did not care for truth,
^ Greek Prose Style (Oxford 1952) 41.
' This subject is discussed at greater length in North, "Swimming Upside Down in the
Wrong Direction: Plato's Criticism of Sophistic Rhetoric on Technical and Stylistic
Grounds," Traditio 32 (1976) 11-29. I quote from pp. 11-12 in slightly altered form.
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only for what was probable or persuasive. To seem, rather than to be, was
its goal. This indifference to truth for its own sake led sophistic rhetoric to
a position of neutrality about moral values. It sought to please and gratify
its audience, with a view to winning victories and scoring points, not to
arrive at an understanding of the Good, certainly not to leave its hearers
better than it found them. Success and power constituted the goal of
sophistic rhetoric; these were, after all, the reasons why students flocked to
the Sophists in the first place. As a consequence of these two
characteristics—being indifferent to truth and aiming at gratification
—
yet a
third grievous flaw emerged: Rhetoric used modes of persuasion repugnant
tojhe philosopher, appealing to the emotions rather than to the intellect.
HenceTTafo^ was boimd^lo oppose it on the same grounds as imitative
poetry in the Republic: It encouraged the domination of the lower faculties
of the soul over the higher. Such poetry is in fact a form of rhetoric
addressed to a mob, Plato tells us in the Republic (604e5). Hence both
poetry and rhetoric invite the same condemnation, and for the same reasons.
The arguments against sophistic rhetoric are set forth at greatest length
in the Gorgias, and it is fascinating to see how long they survived,
supplying the ammunition used by philosophers in the intermittent warfare
against rhetoric that broke out with new vehemence when the Romans
appeared on the horizon—those rich and powerful barbarians, eager to be
hellenized in certain limited ways, and willing to pay for the process. The
rhetoricians of course devised counter-arguments, which were in their turn
canonized. We may estimate the seriousness with which Plato's polemic
continued to be taken nearly five centuries after the Gorgias by the zeal with
which Aelius Aristides, a representative of the Second Sophistic, responded
to the Platonic attack in two long treatises written close to the middle of the
second century of our era. One treatise was a defence of rhetoric itself, the
other a defence of the four statesmen whom Plato had denounced in the
Gorgias for leaving Athens worse than they had found her. Yet at the
conclusion of the first treatise, Aristides^admits^Xhat Plato is the father and
teacher of ccators,'* and it is the positive aspect of Plato's love-hate relation
to rhetoric that I wish to pursue, not the negative.
The mention of Gorgias, the greatest of the sophistic rhetoricians of the
first generation, reminds me that by a curious coincidence Plato was bom
(according to the best tradition) in the very year in which Gorgias paid his
first, famous visit to Athens, 428/7 B.C. If the two events did indeed
coincide, it follows that the most vigorous and effective enemy of sophistic
rhetoric embarked on what was to be a long lifetime (Plato lived to be 80)
just as the greatest champion of that rhetoric, akeady half-way through an
even longer life (108 years), appeared on the scene of some of his most
glittering triumphs.
* Aristides 2. 465 Behr. For the dates of the two Defences consult C. A. Behr, P. Aelius
Aristides. The Complete Works I (Leiden 1986) 449. 460.
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The impact of Gorgias, Protagoras, and the rest of that first group of
Sophists on Athenian intellectual, political, and cultural life in the next two
decades is fully documented in the literature of the period. It would have
been quite impossible for Plato to escape exposure to the technical devices
introduced or popularized by the Sophists (any more than their moral and
political views), and his Dialogues are full of evidence that he did not, in
fact, escape. We know very little about Plato's education. Neither the
Dialogues nor the Epistles contain direct references to his schooling. The
names of his music teacher, his wrestling teacher, and the man who taught
him grammar survive in various anecdotes,^ but there is never a word about
any training in rhetoric. We know, of course, Plato's social position in
Athens, and we can guess what opportunities he would have had. His
father, who traced his descent from the mythical kings of Athens, died when
Plato was a child, and his mother (a descendant of Solon) married as her
second husband a man who was a close friend and supporter of Pericles. (He
was, in fact, the father of Demos, said to be the eromenos of Callicles in the
Gorgias.) A boy of Plato's connections would have heard and seen, at close
range, whatever went on in Athenian political life in the turbulent years that
followed the Sicilian disaster of 415: the fall of the democracy, the rise and
fall of the Four Hundred and then the Thirty Tyrants, the trial of Antiphon,
the overthrow of Theramenes, the return and second departure of Alcibiades.
During these formative years Plato obviously absorbed the rhetorical
techniques that were being adapted, not only to the needs of the lawcourts
and the public assemblies, but also to those of the tragic and comic theatre.
His friendship with Socrates would have given his life a specific orientation;
it would not have wiped out what he had observed all about him during the
years when he was growing up. So it is only to be expected that the
Dialogues are richly, endlessly rhetorical, owing so much of their form to
the strategies perfected by the Sophists that it may even be said that without
rhetoric there would have been no Dialogues as we know them, no Plato, in
fact—certainly no Platonic Socrates.
Let us consider a few of the ways in which Plato is revealed as the heir
of sophistic rhetoric. First and most obvious is his extensive use of formal
orations in the Dialogues. Plato is in fact a logographer (a writer of
speeches for others to deliver) of the first rank. For variety, range, mastery
of all the available means of persuasion (in Aristotelian terms ethos, pathos,
logos) he has no equal. It is, from one point of view, a pity that he was
deflected from his early ambition to be a statesman, because an orator greater
than Pericles may have been lost when Plato turned away from active
politics and took shelter under that famous wall (Rep. 6, 496).
What is probably the single, best-known dialogue of Plato is not a
dialogue at all, but a pseudo-forensic oration, the Apology of Socrates.
'See Alice Swift Riginos, Platonica: The Anecdotes Concerning the Life and Writings
of Plato (Leiden 1976) 39-51.
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Realizing as we must that there is no compelling proof that Socrates made
any speech whatsoever at his trial, and that if he made a speech there is no
reason to believe it was anything like this, we should recognize the strong
pressures that led Plato to choose precisely this form for his vindication, not
so much of Socrates, as of the philosophic life. The tension between the
familiar form of the courtroom oration, well known to us from the Attic
orators, and the substance that Plato embodies in this form is so dynamic as
to make the Apology the most successful, as it is the most thorough, of all
his adaptations of rhetorical forms. But other dialogues are almost as
profoundly indebted. The Menexenus and the Symposium, in their very
different ways, both depend on Plato's sovereign mastery of the form and the
topics of, respectively, the funeral oration and the encomium, just as the
Phaedrus is what it is because Plato can manipulate the paradoxical
encomium with the most dazzling virtuosity.
Some readers, I suspect, fail to notice how skillfully Plato exploits the
possibilities of formal oratory within a dialogue. No one, to be sure, is
likely to miss the way he focuses attention on the series of speeches in the
Symposium, adapts each speech to the speaker, organizes the whole set in
irreversible order, and relates them to the dominant image of the ladder, cul-
minating apparently in the speech of Diotima, but actually in that of Alci-
biades. Yet in the Gorgias, for example, Plato leads so unobtrusively into
the great speech of Callicles in praise of the life of ruthless ambition that
few, I imagine, think of it in terms of oratory. (Certainly few modem com-
mentators do justice to its rhetorical skill.)^ But from the very start Plato
gives us clues to what he is doing, as Callicles begins with an accusation
typical of rejoinders in the Assembly, a charge that his opponent is bab-
bling like a demagogue. The eloquence of his argument for the rule of the
strong is due in large measure to his employment of time-honored rhetorical
devices: quotations and interpretations of poetry, rhetorical questions, and a
great variety of figures, including parallel structure, climax, and poly-
syndeton. The sentence about the revolt of the man who is by nature strong
(484a) is especially instructive in its deployment of such devices, and it was
this passage, E. R. Dodds suggests,^ that inspired Nietzsche.
An instance of even more unobtrusive borrowing from the techniques of
the courtroom occurs at the outset of Republic 5, where Plato introduces
Socrates' discussion of the community of wives with what amounts to the
standard topics of the proem, spUt between Glaucon and Socrates in such a
way that the resemblance to oratory is disguised, yet the devices for arousing
interest, disclaiming expert knowledge, and winning favor are all effectively
manipulated (449d-51c). The adaptation of oratorical conventions to the
dialogue-form was one of PTafo's niost brilliant discoveries, especially
' Bui E. R. Dodds, Plalo. Gorgias (Oxford 1959) 267, comments on the "supeib
rhetorical vigour" of 483c7-84c3.
^ Dodds (previous note) 389
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evident in the Gorgias, Republic, Symposium, and Phaedrus. Whenever
reahstic dialogue is abandoned, rhetorical elements make an entirely different
contribution, as can be seen in the last of Plato's works.
The Laws resorts unashamed to the manner of a treatise, and at
moments of heightened intensity needs a change of pace, which is regularly
secured through the introduction of oratory or oratorical devices. But even
here the use of oratory has a function much more organic than mere stylistic
variation. The Address to the Settlers in the new city to be founded on
Crete (715e-18c) is a case in point It constitutes a model of the persuasive
proem that the Athenian Stranger (who replaces Socrates in this final dia-
logue) recommends for all the important laws of the new politeia. The ideal
situation (he says) would be one in which the citizens would be extremely
easy to persuade in the direction of virtue (718c), and the proem to any legal
code should help make them more docile and well-disposed (723a, cf. 718d).
These, of course, are the traditional functions of the proem according to
standard rhetorical doctrine.* The Stranger gives examples of legislation that
merely states the law and specifies the penalty, and the same legislation
when equipped with a persuasive proem, and Uien goes on to formulate a
long and elaborate proem to the entire legal code, while admitting that
everything that has been said up to this point (Books 1, 2, and 3) has in fact
been a kind of gigantic proem. The Address to the Settlers itself is
essentially a homily, dealing with the most lofty subjects (the nature of
God, the relation of man to God, the political consequences of piety and
impiety), and it accurately forecasts the religious context of the ideal state.
But beyond the obvious use of formal oratory of various types, Plato's
dialogues abound in rhetorical techniques that enrich and give form to the
expression of his thought. Consider his mastery of ethos, pathos, and
logos, the three Aristotelian modes of persuasion that I have already
mentioned. Logos (argumentation) we may take for granted in the
development of the dialogue form, but the other two are deployed in ways
that now seem obvious only because we are so familiar with what Plato
achieves by their use. Ethos (characterization) and pathos (emotional
appeal) are ideally combined in the persona of Socrates, nowhere more
effectively than in the Apology, where in a heightened manner they perform
the functions that ethos and pathos normally do in any courtroom speech for
the defence. But these essentially rhetorical methods of gaining assent
continue to appear in non-oratorical contexts. The very existence of the
Socrates who has dominated the history of ethics testifies to the rhetorical
genius of Plato, for the ethos established in the Apology, the Crito, and the
Phaedo is responsible for the pathos that so moves us in these works and
directs our response to the drama of Socrates' death.
' Consult H. Caplan on the Rhetorica ad Herennium 1. 4. 6 for the history of this
doctrine both before and after Aristotle. See also Quintilian 4. 1.5.
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Neither ethos nor pathos was invented by the rhetoricians, to be sure,
but it was they who systematized what had long been practiced in poetry and
was now being refined and defined for the benefit of the orators. We know
that Thrasymachus, the rhetor who speaks so forcefully in Book 1 of the
Republic, worked out ways of appealing to the emotions, especially pity,'
and while we cannot so easily identify the one who took the first steps in
establishing the doctrine of ethos, we need not doubt that the subject was
discussed among professionals. Aristotle tells us as much in the Rhetoric,
when he responds both to those who denied that ethos was of any
importance to the orator, and to those who thought it was indeed important
but could best be secured by means outside the speech itself (1. 2. 4-7,
1356al-27). Aristotle's own requirement (that ethos develop within the
oration) would have been more than adequately satisfied by the procedure
used in the Apology. There Plato's achievement is particularly worth
studying because of the ambiguity of his task, an ambiguity derived from
his twofold audience, the members of the jury supposedly being addressed by
Socrates and the readers of the Apology from that day to this. Because of
the historical fact that Socrates was condemned to death, Plato was obliged
to design a speech that would make this outcome comprehensible. Hence
the apparent arrogance evinced by Socrates at certain points in his defence,
an attitude that would inevitably have antagonized a jury (as it does many
undergraduates to this day). Because Plato was using the trial to
demonstrate the supreme value of the philosophical life, the speech had to
reveal a character that would win the admiration of thoughtful readers. It is
the readers who really matter, and the ethos of the Platonic Socrates
demonstrated in this speech is designed for its effect on them.^^
Another obvious debt is related to oratorical structure. The sophistic
rhetors usually organized their teaching around the concept of the "parts of
the oration," and while this approach ultimately proved less satisfactory than
the Peripatetic focus on the functions of the orator (known in Latin as the
officia oratoris)—invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery—it
did provide the novice speaker with specific, detailed guidance in shaping his
proem and his epilogue and all that stretched between. Plato was
thoroughly familiar with the stereotypes, and he uses them with
consummate skill, as when at the beginning of the Apology he
simultaneously derides and exploits the cliche about being inexperienced in
speaking, most overworked of all the topics of the proem. Adapting this
cliche, he makes Socrates protest his inexperience in the courtroom and at
' Cf. Plato. Phaedrus 267c-d.
^° For a comparison to the challenge faced by Euripides, when he wrote Hippolytus'
speech in his own defence before Theseus, see North, "Socrates Deinos Legein," in
Language and the Tragic Hero: Essays on Greek Tragedy in Honor of Gordon M. Kirkwood,
ed. P. Pucci (Atlanta 1988) 121-30. The portrayal of Socrates as the philosophic hero is
analyzed by E. Wolff, Platons Apologie (Berlin 1929). See also R. L. Fowler, "The
Rhetoric of Desperation," HSCP 91 (1987) 5-38.
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the same time redefine the supreme oratorical quality of deinotes as "to
speak the truth" (17a). The reader follows the paradoxical development of
this definition throughout the speech and ultimately realizes that under the
guise of the well-worn assertion of apeiria (inexperience) Plato has served
notice that his Socrates both rejects the values common to the Athenians
and gives a new meaning to their accepted vocabulary.
Still another example of Plato's exploitation of familiar sophistic
techniques appears in the speech assigned to Agathon in the Symposium,
where the Gorgianic style of the speaker is parodied and the topic of the
cardinal virtues as the basis of encomium is treated in a perverse and
sophistic manner. ^^ In both ways—by the parody of sophistic style and by
the exposure of sophistic thinking—he reveals Agathon's eulogy of Eros to
be seriously flawed. '
Most of what I have said so far applies to the dialogues in which long,
connected speeches play a prominent part. But Plato's debt to rhetoric is
equally pervasive, if less immediately obvious, in the non-oratorical
dialogues. It would probably go too far to claim that Plato owes to rhetoric
the very texture of his style, for Plato's style draws upon many sources
—
Ionian philosophy and poetry to name two that stand out
—
yet much of
what makes his dialogues memorable, much of what enables his thought to
find persuasive expression, springs from the devices, the figures, the
elements of style worked out by sophistic rhetoricians. The figures that we
associate with Gorgias (antithesis, isocolon, parison, homoeoteleuton) were
not, of course, invented by him; every one of them can be identified in pre-
Gorgianic prose, and before that in poetry. But Gorgias refined and
systematized the figures and inspired his students, such as Polus and
Antisthenes, to write treatises "On Style," which carried into the second
generation of sophistic rhetoricians the interest in elegance of diction and
figurative language that constitutes an enduring legacy of rhetoric to the
development of Greek prose.
Plato by no means confines himself to the Gorgianic figures, although
it is amusing to see how frequently he is reproached by ancient critics for
excessive Gorgianisms. His ability to mould a style capable of conveying a
vast range of ideas (a style that with equal effectiveness encompasses all the
gradations from the plain to the grand—^and there are many more than three
gradations) and his ability to fit the style both to the speaker in a given
dialogue and to the subject under discussion, these twin abilities derive from
his mastery of a multitude of rhetorical devices (figures of thought and
figures of diction), his penetration into the mysteries of ethos and pathos,
and ultimately his sure grasp of the principle of the prepon (what is
appropriate). This basic virtus dicendi enabled him to organize and adorn in
the most effective way what his powers of inventio had produced.
^^ For a more detailed analysis of Agalhon's speech as a parody of Gorgias, see North
(above, note 3) 19-20.
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One way to test this statement is to read the Phaedrus, both for its doc-
trine and for the way that doctrine is expressed. What I have in mind, very
briefly, is (1) the emphasis on the prepon and its synonyms in Socrates'
criticism of Lysias' speech as lacking in ananke logographike (264b), a term
immediately explicated as the organization of a discourse like a living thing,
whose middle and extremities are suited to one another (TipeTiovxa
aXXi\Xoi(;), (2) his praise of his own two speeches as demonstrating the
principle of definition, which leads to clarity and self-consistency (to avxb
a\)t© 6^oXoYot>)i£vov 265d), (3) his comparison of a genuine art of rhetoric
to the genuine art of tragedy, which consists of the appropriate integration
(7tpE7io\)oav ovoxaaiv) of dramatic speeches so that they are in harmony
(o-uvioxa^EVTiv) with one another and with the whole (268d), (4) his
insistence that one who practices the truly rhetorical and persuasive art must
adapt speeches to souls out of a knowledge of which arguments will be
persuasive to which souls (271b), (5) his comprehensive recapitulation in
which he requires a recognition of the kairos, the appropriate moment for
speech or silence, for one kind of speech or another, and finally (6) his
consideration of euprepeia and aprepeia in writing, as well as in speaking
(274b). These passages demonstrate Plato's exquisite sensitivity to the
prepon as a fundamental principle of discourse. The doctrine is present
throughout the Phaedrus, not merely as a theory emphasized in the rhetorical
section, but as the underiying justification for the variety of styles employed
in the earlier, dramatic and mythological parts.
If I may turn from style to a particular topic closely identified with
rhetoric in its political context—one that justifies the Sophists' concern for
the techniques of deliberative, as well as forensic and epideictic oratory-^let
me mention the orator-statesman, normally called a rhetor in Athenian
usage, ^^ but for Plato more often a politikos. Plato's attitude toward this
figure, while consistently hostile, shows variations related to the dominant
interest of specific dialogues.
As is well known, the Apology reflects the conviction that the
philosopher, not the orator-statesman, is the true benefactor of the polls.
According to Socrates, no just man can survive if he enters politics; he who
fights for the right must do so in private, not in public (31c). Socrates
himself, the self-proclaimed gadfly of Athens, has been prevented from
taking part in public life by his dalmonlon, the mysterious sign, internal
yet somehow divine, that warns him against certain actions, and he has
therefore accepted the paradoxical position of being at once apragmon, one
who minds his own business, a non-meddler, and polypragmon, one who
meddles in other people's business, performing the greatest service to the
state, but always as a private citizen (31d-32a).^^ Socrates' method of
12 See M. H. Hansen. "The Athenian 'PoUticians' 403-322 B.C.." GRBS 24 (1983)
33-55 for the customary terminology, and The Athenian Assembly (Oxford 1987) 49-69.
13 On this paradox see L. B. Carter. The Quiet Athenian (Oxford 1986) 183-86.
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dialectical refutation, the elenchus (not the statesman's oratorical deinotes) is
what truly advances the welfare of the citizens.
/
The same auitude is developed at much greater length in the Gorgias,
but it can also be detected in certain shorter dialogues, which are not
primarily interested in the position of the orator-statesman, but comment
tangentially on this topic. In the Euthydemus, for example, we find
Socrates debating with two teachers of eristic, and in the course of the
conversation sharply distinguishing the object of politics from the object of
philosophy (306a-b). He also briefly considers whether to subsume the art
of speech-making under the art of politics (290b-91d), and observes that
neither of these arts can make us happy. The Meno criticizes four celebrated
Athenian statesmen for failing to teach their sons the excellence that they
themselves possessed (93c-94b). In the Gorgias this charge is extended to
include the failiu^e to instruct all the citizens. When Callicles praises the
great statesmen of the past for having employed a noble kind of rhetoric,
Socrates retorts that they failed in the primary task of the noble rhetor, to
instil virtue. Not only their own sons, as in the Meno, but all the citizens
have thus been neglected, because they have been flattered by the orators
instead of being corrected and told the truth. And now Socrates, who earlier
in the Gorgias had reaffirmed the distinction between what the politikoi do
and what he does, saying explicitly, "I am not one of the politikoi" (473e),
startles us by saying, "I think that I am one of the few persons in Athens
(not to say the only one) who attempt the art of politics, and alone of men
living today, I attend to political affairs" (521d). Socrates is able to make
this statement because he now admits the theoretical possibility of a noble
art of rhetoric, in contrast to the debased kind used by the Athenian rhetors,
and the politikos who will use the noble rhetoric can be identified with the
philosopher, who aims to make the citizens as good as possible, saying
what is best, whether pleasant or the reverse (502e, 503a). '
How such a noble rhetoric would actually operate the Gorgias does not
reveal, nor does the Republic take us much farther, since although the
philosopher and the ruler are now identified, the resulting paragon is not
called a politikos, much less a rhetor, and under the conditions postulated for
the ideal state the philosopher-king has little need of oratory to convince the
citizens that they should adopt any given legislative proposal. The
Republic shows no interest in legislation or constitutional procedures. The
philosopher-kings are accepted by those they rule because of their expert
knowledge, attained through the long process of education that culminates in
dialectic and knowledge of the Forms. By a combination of peitho
(persuasion) and ananke (compulsion) they harmonize the citizens and
contrive to make each one do his own work for the good of the whole
(519b-20a), but we learn very little about the actual means of persuasion (or
o( ananke, for that matter).
An entirely different situation obtains in Plato's final work, the Laws,
which not only accepts the need for legislation to achieve the best politeia
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compatible with human weakness, but devotes serious attention to
persuasion as an instrument of the ruler. Two earlier dialogues, the
Phaedrus and the Politikos, help us to understand Plato's attitude in this
final treatment of the role of rhetoric in the state. The Phaedrus develops
the hint of the Gorgias about a philosophical art of rhetoric, illustrating it
by the accomplishment of Pericles under the guidance of Anaxagoras (269e),
and extends the scope of this rhetoric to include private and written logoi, as
well as spoken oratory, specifically mentioning written laws (278c).
The Politikos revives the suggestion made in the Euthydemus about a
political art that would know how to make use of the results of other arts,
such as speech-making and generalship. Now the statesman whose nature
and functions are discussed in the Politikos will make use of expert advice
in fields that he himself need not master. A kind of rhetoric called by the
novel term rhetoreia—perhaps invented by Plato to avoid the invidious
implications of rhetorike—shares in the ruler's art (304a). The task of the
statesman is to decide whether persuasion or compulsion or neither is to be
employed. The task of rhetoreia, once that decision has been made, is to
render persuasive what is just. It will persuade the general mass of the
population by telling them stories (mythologia), rather than by imparting
instruction (didache, 304d). Before we conclude that mythologia necessarily
conveys a contemptuous connotation, we should ponder Plato's own uses of
myth and the relation of myth to didache (or apodeictic) in such dialogues as
the Symposium, Phaedrus, or Timaeus. /
The Laws permits us to see rhetoreia functioning in the service of the
state. The official responsible for exercising persuasion is now called a
nomothetes (legislator), never a rhetor, and there are remarkably few
references to any related word, even rhetorikos, in the Laws, but a great
many to peitho and peithein, which are regularly coupled with words that
mean to teach
—
didaskein, paideuein, and the like. The uses of persuasion
in the Laws are so many and varied as to defy enumeration in a brief
suvey,^'* but they clearly demonstrate Plato's strong, continuing interest in
the relation of rhetoric to statesmanship and his originality in adapting
various rhetoricaFtechniques to the needs of the Cretan city. I have
mentioned the use of persuasive proems to the laws. A law not so equipped
is referred to as a nomos akratos (unmixed law), which constitutes a
tyrannical imposition, relying only on coercion (723a). Another rhetorical
technique employs praise and blame, the matter of traditional epideictic, as a
mode of education, used in connection with games and festivals and
governed by strict rules determining not only who is worthy to receive
praise, but who is eligible to bestow it. What Plato calls nappriaia ev
MovottK; (freedom of speech amid the Muses) turns out to be important for
the Cretan city (829c).
•* Consult G. Morrow. Plato's Cretan City (Princeton 1960) 552-60, and "Plato's
Concept of Persuasion." Philosophical Review 62 (1953) 234-50.
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One measure of the difference between the Republic and the Laws may
be seen in the different ways the two states come into being. In the
Republic philosophers become kings, and the philosophers are such by
virtue of their mastery of dialectic. In the Laws the ideal city could come
into existence under two conditions: first, if there should be a young tyrant
possessed of certain qualifications (youth, self-control, a good memory,
courage, a noble nature, and—best of all
—
good luck), and secondly, if this
young ruler should find a great lawgiver to give him advice (709e-10b).
The qualifications of the lawgiver in turn are summed up by comparison to
a mythical exemplar—Nestor, the honey-tongued orator of the Iliad, who
excelled all other men in the power of speech and in sophrosyne (7 lie).
The element of arete retains the same importance it has always had in
Plato's political thought, but dialectical ability has now made room for
rhetoric. /
It is time to turn to the other, perhaps less familiar, half of our subject:
Plato's influence on rhetoric, not his debt, but his legacy. Once again, I
shall omit the negative side, the way in which Plato's anti-rhetorical
arguments continued to be used, adapted, and elaborated by the Hellenistic
philosophical schools, by the enemies of rhetoric in Rome, and by
opponents in even later times, who repeated Plato's charges that rhetoric
was morally and artistically indefensible and that it harmed both the state
and the rhetorician himself. ^^ Let me instead mention some of the positive
effects that Plato had on rhetoric and oratory, prose-writing in general, and
literary criticism in particular.
It is, I think, widely accepted that the Rhetoric of Aristotle develops
certain notions sketched in the Phaedrus, the dialogue in which Plato at last
lays the foundation for a rhetoric acceptable according to his standards, as
sophistic rhetoric had not been. Friedrich Solmsen many years ago set forth
the main lines of this argument, especially with respect to the systematic
treatment of emotional appeals. I can do no better than to quote from his
influential article in Classical Philology in 1938 ("Aristotle and Cicero on
the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings"), where an Appendix on the
Phaedrus and the Rhetoric sums up the evidence for Aristotle's indebtedness
to Plato:
In both works rhetoric is based on dialectic, oacpriveia is regarded as
the most essential requirement of the diction, and a demand for the
intrinsic unity of the Xoyot; is put forward and illustrated by a
comparison with the organic unity of an animal's body. Add to this the
description in both of rhetoric as dialectical demonstration plus
yoXotyfOYia, the polemical attitude in both works toward the vulgar
rhetoricians with their systems of xa \i6pia xov X6yo\>, and the fact
^^ The continued use of the second of these arguments is discussed by North, "Inulilis
sibi, perniciosus patriae" ICS 6 (1981) 242-71.
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that tradition . . . has it that Aristotle's rhetorical ^e0o5o(; originated
in the Academy, (pp. 229-30)
The persistence of Plato's influence may be seen in other ways as well.
One that had far-reaching importance was the hierarchy of values that he
established, by which the dyaGa Tfi<; v^Xt1<5» ^^ "goods of the soul," took
priority, followed by those of the body and then by the external advantages
(wealth, friends). This doctrine, already prominent in the Apology (36b-c),
where it justifies Socrates' claim that he is the only true statesman,
exercised its most far-reaching influence on ethical and political philosophy,
but it had an impact on rhetoric also, because it helped to establish the topic
of arete as the essential subject for epideictic oratory, the oratory of praise
and blame. Nothing was more characteristic of the Platonic-Aristotelian (as
distinguished from the sophistic-Isocratean) strain in ancient epideictic than
the insistence that praise is due only to arete, not to the other so-called
goods that people sought or boasted.^^
Moreover, in the very definition of virtue and its various categories,
Plato exercised a unique influence. It had always been customary to
organize eulogy around a set of values approved by the community being
addressed (as in the Athenian epitaphios logos), but the group of virtues
available for such exploitation was shifting and amorphous, both in number
and in content, until Plato in Book 4 of the Republic established a canon of
four excellences (wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation) as necessary for
the perfection of the soul and the state. From then on, but especially after
they had been adopted by the Stoics as the core of their ethical system, these
four virtues were canonized and—to speak only of their role in rhetoric
—
they formed the basis for the regular school instruction in the oratory of
praise and blame. The Roman rhetorical handbooks and the treatises on
epideictic by Menander Rhetor and others make the dominance of the
Platonic ethical system unmistakable.^'^ It came to dominate judicial and
deliberative oratory as well as epideictic, and quickly spread to
historiography, since the schools of rhetoric provided the only training in
the writing of artistic prose available to aspiring historians.
Literary criticism, from Aristotle and Theophrastus onward, owed to
Plato certain doctrines so well known as Platonic in origin that it will
suffice merely to name them, especially since some have been alluded to in
my quotation from Professor Solmsen. In Peripatetic theory, among the
virtues of style (sapheneia, clarity, Hellenismos, correctness, paraskeue,
elaboration, and \heprepon, appropriateness), the first and last, clarity and
^^ See V. Buchheil, Unlersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon von Gorgias
bis Arisloleles (Munich 1960) 84-116.
^' See H. Caplan on the Rhetorica ad Herennium 3. 2. 3 and 3. 6. 11 for the cardinal
virtues in deliberative and epideictic oratory. Consult also D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson,
Menander Rhetor (Oxford 1981) 263.
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appropriateness, are strongly emphasized by Plato.^* The comparison of a
speech or a poem to a living thing, with a demand for organic unity, derives
from the Phaedrus (264c). The conception of the poet as irrational, while
neither original nor exclusive with Plato, found in his Ion and Phaedrus the
treatment that posterity was destined tc remember. Moreover, in the
Phaedrus Plato carried the notion into new territory when he demonstrated
the need both for divine madness and for strict control, derived from the
knowledge of dialectic and psychology. Ultimately the theia mania, divine
madness, of the poet in the Phaedrus was transmuted into the theory of
sophron mania (sane madness), controlled inspiration, which was made to
account for such extravagantly admired oratorical quaUties as the deinotes of
Demosthenes. It contributed also to the concept of to hypsos, the sublime,
in "Longinus."^'
Related to the influence of Plato's theoretical advice about the choice
and arrangement of words and the structure of a speech, and deserving of
close attention (because at certain times it seems to have been much more
widely studied than his theoretical principles) is the emergence of Plato him-
self as a model of style. This is the final topic that I should like to address.
We may begin by returning to Dionysius of Halicamassus, the Greek
historian and rhetorician working in Rome in die time of Augustus, whom I
quoted at the outset In his essay on Demosthenes, part of a series on the
Attic orators, he tells us that certain persons (xiv£<;)
—
probably philoso-
phers, although he does not say so—consider Plato to be daimoniotatos, a
supreme genius, accepted as the definitive model {horos kai kandn) for both
the plain and the forceful styles (23). Such persons even say that if Zeus
spoke Greek, he would sound like Plato. Dionysius maintains that he
himself admires Plato's deinotes in \h& Dialogues, especially those in which
he preserves the Socratic character (rather surprisingly, he cites the
Philebus), but he is highly critical of him when he abandons the style
proper to the dialogue-form. Most especially he dislikes it when Plato
introduces praise and blame into political discussions and tries to convert
them into speeches for the prosecution or the defence. When he does so, he
becomes different from himself and disgraces the philosophical profession.
This is a revealing comment; it shows Dionysius the rhetor on the
defensive. The prominence of speeches in some of the Dialogues is
precisely what attracted to their study young men interested in becoming
orators, especially orator-statesmen in the Ciceronian tradition. Dionysius,
who is above all determined to maintain the supremacy of Demosthenes as
the model of models, mounts a clever attack on Plato the would-be rhetor.
'* Clarity. Phaedrus 265d: appropriateness. 268d. 274b, and see above, pp. 208-09.
'' For the steps by which sophron mania became equivalent to theia mania (with a
striking reversal of the implications of sophron in the Phaedrus), see North, "The Concept
of Sophrosyne in Greek Literary Criticism," CP 43 (1948) 1-17, esp. 14-16 on Ps.-Lucian
and Ps.-Longinus.
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First he ridicules him by applying to him the lines addressed by Zeus to
Aphrodite in the Iliad (5. 428-29), when she flees to him for comfort, after
being wounded by Diomedes:
Not to you, my child, are given the works of war,
But do you busy yourself with the lovely tasks of marriage.
The analogy tends to remove Plato from serious consideration as a model for
the professional speaker. His style is identified with what is soft, charming,
incapable of real polemic. Dionysius then proceeds to compare the
Menexenus with Demosthenes' On the Crown (all the while insisting that it
is a fair comparison because this is the most effective
—
kratistos—of
Plato's politikoi logoi). To compress a very long discussion of Plato's
faults, let me just say that Dionysius tears to pieces passage after passage of
the Menexenus, finding in them unnecessary repetition, defective rhythms,
excessive ornamentation, youthful indulgence in Gorgianic theatrical tricks,
clumsiness, incoherence, even meanness (tapeinotes) and general bad taste
—
akairia, a word that turns up more than once in rhetorical criticism of
Plato's rhetoric (24-29).
Dionysius concludes with still another derogatory comparison, this
time saying that Plato's style is like a flowery spot affording a traveller a
pleasant resting place, while the style of Demosthenes is like a fertile field
providing an abundance of the necessities of hfe, as well as the luxuries that
make for pleasure (32). He repeats his charge that Plato's oratory aims only
at formal beauty, while that of Demosthenes is useful and practical. (One of
the cliches of Greek and Roman criticism is to compare Plato's style to
weapons used on parade, Demosthenes' to weapons of war, Plato's to a body
accustomed to a life of ease in the shade, Demosthenes' to a body hardened
by exercise in the sunlight.)^*'
Yet when he is not attempting to exalt the virtues of Demosthenes,
Dionysius is capable of more objective criticism, and he tells us, in the trea-
tise On Composition, that Plato excelled in the arrangement of words
(though not always in their choice), that he, with Herodotus and Demos-
thenes, merited praise for variation (metabole 19), and that, like Homer and
Sophocles, he used the best kind of synthesis, the well-blended (eukratos),
which constitutes a mean between the austere and the flowery (24), high
praise from a Peripatetic critic. Dionysius is not talking about the middle
style, in the normal sense of the term as used in Greco-Roman criticism,
but rather the middle type of composition or word-placement, yet in fact
Plato is almost invariably cited (along with Isocrates) as a model of the
middle style, a category that he regularly exemplified in Byzantine criticism.
Especially penetrating are some of the observations of "Longinus," an
enthusiastic admirer of Plato. He too compares him with Demosthenes,
^ See F. Walsdorff, Die antiken Urteile uber Platans Stil (Bonn 1927) for a variety of
critical cliches.
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especially in their use of amplification (auxesis), and he likens Plato to a
kind of sea (pelagos), flooding a vast expanse, steady in his majestic and
stately dignity (12). The key words are onkos (weightiness) and
megaloprepes semnotes (great-souled dignity). Plato achieves grandeur
imegethos) in spite of the fact that he flows along with a noiseless current
(a phrase borrowed from the Theaetetus 144b). "Longinus" uses Plato as
the supreme exemplar of how sublimity may be attained through imitation
{mimesis). What Plato imitated was Homer. "Plato irrigated his style with
10,000 rivulets from the great Homeric spring," says "Longinus," and
concludes with the memorable statement that Plato contended with Homer
for the first prize (13. 4).^^
Imitation was of course the basis of the educational system in Greece
and Rome, a circumstance that lent enormous influence to Plato as stylist.
However sharply any rival or critic disagreed with the substance of Plato's
philosophy, the fact remained that he wrote like an angel (or like Zeus in
the ancient commonplace). The desire to understand how he did it and to
imitate his virtuosity has obsessed critics, rhetoricians, and even some
philosophers from antiquity to modem times. Among the rhetorically
oriented critics the most influential in late antiquity was certainly
Hermogenes of Tarsus, a contemporary of Marcus Aurelius, whose treatise
Perildeon (On Ideas or Forms of Style)^^ left its impress on Byzantine
literature and criticism, as well as on writing of the imperial age in Greece.
Brought to the West by George of Trebizond in 1426 and translated into
Latin by 1538, it exercised a pervasive influence on Latin and vernacular
literature of the Renaissance.^^ The very title of this treatise betrays its
Platonic inspiration. As George Kustas has said, "... in Hermogenes we
are witnessing the decisive step in the process of the Platonization of
rhetoric."^"* We might also say that in Hermogenes we witness the
culmination of the process of "rhetoricizing" Plato, a process that had long
since proclaimed itself in such remarks as that of Dionysius of
Halicarnassus about the expectation that Plato should serve as a kandn
orthoepeias, a standard of correct diction {Dem. 26). By the imperial age the
philosopher had become a model of style, and although readers who cared
only for style, with no regard for content, must have been in the minority,
as De Lacy observes,^ one or two such readers are on record, including the
^^ Consult D. A. Russell, "Longinus" On the Sublime (Oxford 1964) esp. xxxix-xl and
109-17.
"Translated by C. W. Wooten as Hermogenes. On Types of Style (Chapel Hill 1987).
^ For its influence in the West, consult A. Patterson, Hermogenes and the Renaissance:
Seven Ideas of Style (Princeton 1970).
'^Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric (Thessaloniki 1973) 163.
^ P. De Lacy, "Plato and the Intellectual Life of the Second Century A.D." in Ap-
proaches to the Second Sophistic, ed. G. W. Bowersock (University Park, PA 1974) 7-8.
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student of Taurus mentioned by Aulus Gellius, and Pronto, the teacher of
Marcus AureUus.^^
The judgments pronounced by Hermogenes were to be decisive in
defining Plato's stylistic impact in late antiquity and Byzantium. His Peri
Ideon identifies seven Porms of style (each of them with several
subdivisions) and describes each Porm according to eight categories (such as
diction, figures, composition, rhythm). Several of the Porms are illustrated
by references to Plato. Beauty (hallos). Grandeur (megethos). Solemnity
(semnotes)—a subdivion of megethos. Sweetness (glykytes) and Modesty
(epieikeia)—two subdivisions of Character {ethos)—are regarded as
eminently Platonic, and Hermogenes advises his readers to study specific
passages in the dialogues in order to recognize and imitate these qualities.^^
Most revealing among Hermogenes' comments on Plato's style is his
repeated assertion that Plato is the supreme model of what he calls
panegyric, a term that is now equivalent to the epideictic genre, but has a
greatly expanded meaning. Panegyric includes historiography and most
other forms of prose-writing (what Plato prophetically called logographia in
the Phaedrus), and even, at one point, includes poetry as well.^^
Hermogenes maintains that Plato's is the most beautiful panegyrical style
in prose. In fact, he is to panegyric what Demosthenes is to deliberative and
judicial oratory, and what Homer is to poetry.^
Menander Rhetor also, in the late third century, author (or supposed
author) of influential treatises on epideictic, makes it clear that Plato
dominates the genre.^^ This dominance continued into Byzantine times,
when the schools were heavily influenced by Neoplatonic commentaries on
Hermogenes and other rhetorical writers, as well as on Plato's Gorgias €Jid
Phaedrus themselves, and rhetoric was used, not for its original purposes,
but to prepare for the study of philosophy.^^ A remarkable development
was the equation of the three types of oratory with the three Platonic
faculties of the soul. As reported by the Prolegomenon of Marcellinus (late
fourth or early fifth century), the highest faculty (the rational) is associated
with panegyric. ^2 What had been regarded in earlier times as the more
important types, the judicial and the deliberative, were linked with the
inferior faculties, the spirited and the appetitive. Hence the kind of rhetoric
in which Plato was thought to excel corresponded to what, in his
organization of the tripartite soul, was undeniably the highest faculty.
^ Both cited by De Lacy (previous note) 6, 8.
'" Peri Ideon, ed. Rabe. 297. 246. 247. 386. 387. 243. 244. 337. 348.
^ Consult Wooten (above, note 22) 138-39.
2' Rabe (above, note 27) 386-90.
^ See Russell and Wilson (above, note 17) xxxviii and Index under "Plato."
'^ See G. A. Kennedy. "Late Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric
13 (1980) 181-82.
'^Rabe, Prolegomenon Sylloge, 286; consult Kennedy (previous note) 188.
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Another source of Hermogenes' influence on later attitudes toward
Plato's style lay in the unprecedented flexibility of his critical method. By
considering the possible combinations and permutations of the seven Forms
and their thirteen sub-Forms, Hermogenes far outstripped such predecessors
as Demetrius and Dionysius in the subtlety with which he could analyze and
describe the characteristics of any particular author. Thus, as Kustas
observes, ^^ he came to have a special appeal for Christian thinkers,
conscious of the uniqueness of the individual soul. Moreover, some of the
Forms that Hermogenes identified were themselves particularly attractive to
Christianity. Simplicity (apheleia) and Dignity (semnotes) were both
considered characteristic of Christian literature. In Hermogenes' system
these two Forms were opposed, yet they were both exemplified by Plato,
who thus became of interest, not only for what he said, but for how he said
it. Furthermore, the quality of grandeur (megethos), which ancient critics
found in Plato (and of which semnotes is a subdivision for Hermogenes)
was thought to include an element that the Neoplatonist Proclus terms the
enigmatic and identifies as one source of Plato's vigor (pathos). Since for
Byzantine criticism obscurity (asapheia) is sometimes a virtue of style
(when clarity would reveal to the uninitiated what they should not be told),
the Platonic example could profitably be studied in this connection too, as
the relation of the enigmatic to the obscure was analyzed.^
Among other associations between the style of Plato and the special
concerns of Byzantine Uterary culture traced by Kustas, particular importance
attaches to the increasing use of moral terminology derived from Plato to
describe stylistic distinctions, and the consequent tendency to identify
aesthetic with moral standards. The extension of the concepts of propriety
(the prepon) and appropriateness (Jcairos) in Byzantine Uterary theory, as a
means of giving suitable expression to the divine or cosmic order, and the
relation of this development to Plato's Timaeus deserve notice.^^
Long before the Byzantine era, to be sure, the Timaeus had been
prominent in stylistic criticism, as well as in the study of Plato's thought.
"Longinus" cites the famous description of the human body in Timaeus
65c-85e as a series of metaphors making for sublimity (while noting also
that it is because of such passages that Plato is criticized for his Bacchic
frenzy, 32. 7). If we look ahead many years to the renaissance of Byzantine
literature in the eleventh century, we learn that Michael Psellus set for
himself twin goals: to improve his stylistic eloquence through rhetoric and
to purify his spirit through philosophy. "Philosophy without rhetoric has
no charm (charis), and rhetoric without philosophy has no content
(schema) "^^ The model for what he hopes to achieve is the Timaeus. In
" Studies (above, note 24) 17.
^Consult Kustas (above, note 24) 12, 39-40.
'' Kusus (above, note 24) 41-42.
^ Chronographia 6. 107.
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this determination to reconcile rhetoric with philosophy and this choice of a
model Psellus may serve as our final example of the persistent, benign
influence of Plato, orator summus.
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